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Abstract 
We introduce a decision-making model based on value functions that include individualistic utility 
function and socio-constructivistic norm function, and propose a norm-fostering process that 
recursively updates norm function through mutual recognition between the self and others. As an 
example, we will look at the resource-sharing problem typical of economic activities and assume 
the distribution of individual actions to define the (1) norm function fostered through mutual 
comparison of value/action ratio based on the equity theory (progressive tax-like), (2) norm 
function proportional to resource utilization (proportional tax-like) and (3) fixed norm function 
independent of resource utilization (fixed tax-like). And, by carrying out numerical simulation, we 
will show that the progressive tax-like norm function (i) does not increase disparity for the 
distribution of the actions, unlike the other norm functions, and (ii) has high resource productivity 
and low Gini coefficient, i.e., the progressive tax-like norm function has the highest sustainability 
and fairness. 
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1. Introduction 
In various countries of the world, social problems, such as disparity and inequality problems among 
individuals, regions, and countries, energy problems related to dependence on fossil fuels and 
nuclear power accidents, and environmental problems related to global warming and environmental 
pollution, are emerging. To solve these social problems and aim for a sustainable, fair and inclusive 
society, we cannot avoid consideration of social norms in a broad sense such as fairness, equity, 
goodness, justice, obligation, morality and ethics. The subjects of our research are how to 
incorporate the concept of social norms and ethics into the idea of rational decision making which 
was mainstream in economics and political science, how to understand and diagnose actions of 
individuals and groups in real society, and further how to intervene in the social system. 
 
The major challenge in practically approaching social problems, in addition to interpreting and 
diagnosing individual and group actions in the real world from both aspects of utility and norm, is 
creating a prescription while making a prognosis based on the diagnosis, and determining how to 
intervene into the social system, i.e., how to, so to speak, clinically and medically treat the social 
system. The conventional social intelligence paradigms are based on physical models for explaining 
phenomena and predicting the future based on analysis of data obtained from the phenomena, as 
well as on historical models for explaining origins and preventing future disasters based on analysis 
of history, from the past to the present. However, human economy and society are complex systems 
composed entirely of various interacting components, and are considered as autopoietic systems 
that bring about a cyclic network between components and generational changes in the components, 
as described by Niklas Luhmann in his social systems theory (Luhmann, 1996). Dealing with 
human society, which is a complex and constantly changing cyclic system, requires clinical medical 
models that carry out intervention based on continuous diagnosis and prognosis, rather than 
reductionist physical models or historical models that rely on transient phenomena, and necessitates 
the building of co-evolutionary relationships between the real world and practical intervention. 
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Therefore, prior to making diagnosis and prescriptions, we sought to clarify what social norms are 
needed by a sustainable and fair society, and, in terms of economics, what social norms should be 
set against general utility theories. 
 
Going back to the past, Adam Smith said "He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in 
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it." 
in "The Wealth of Nations" (Smith, 1776). In support of this prediction, Kenneth Arrow and Gérard 
Debreu et al. proved that society reaches its optimum state when the contract is complete and all 
individuals pursue their own self-interests as the first fundamental theorems of welfare economics. 
 
On the other hand, Smith said "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it." in "The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments" (Smith, 1759). Arrow said "I want, however, to conclude by calling 
attention to a less visible form of social action: norms of social behavior, including ethical and 
moral codes. I suggest as one possible interpretation that they are reactions of society to compensate 
for market failures. " as to how a complete contract cannot exist in real society (Arrow, 1970). 
 
As examples of previous research on social norms taking over the discussion of Smith and Arrow, 
philosopher Joseph Heath has proposed the adoption of normative appropriateness as deontic 
constraints into a rational choice model based on the expected utility theory for decision making 
(Heath, 2008). Economist Kaushik Basu has acknowledged the existence of subjective moral costs 
in decision making (Basu, 2010). Economist Masahiko Aoki has shown that community norms 
emerge intrinsically when the cost for cooperation is smaller than the loss from social ostracization, 
by linking the commons game and social exchange game (Aoki, 2001). Economist Samuel Bowles 
has forwarded the importance of moral motivation and social preference in markets based on 
incomplete contracts (Bowles, 2017). The common viewpoint of these researches is that they all 
point out the need for incorporating social norms, which include morals and ethics, not only 
economic utility, into individual decision-making models. 
 
Previous research dealt with the expected utility theory, prospect theory, etc. as individual decision-
making models in microeconomics (e.g. Gilboa, 2010), with altruism and reciprocity through 
various game experiments in experimental economics (e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 2013), and with 
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axiomatic characterization of institutionalized mechanisms as normative and ethical approaches in 
welfare economics (e.g. Sen, 2017). For example, the expected utility theory discusses risk-averse 
type and risk-seeking type utility function forms in making decisions to maximize the expected 
value of utility for choices under conditions of uncertainty. The prospect theory explains reference 
points and loss aversion (non-linearity) in making decisions based on utility functions that are 
assigned with weights for probability weighting function. The game theory expresses utility 
functions, for example, using a prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix, ultimatum game logic tree, and 
public goods game allocation rules, and discusses the Pareto efficiency and competitive equilibrium 
for decision-making strategies. Welfare economics proposes theorems pertaining to competitive 
equilibrium and Pareto efficiency based on completeness and transitivity axioms, and also 
formulates mappings from sets of individuals and economic environments to sets of individual 
goods and capabilities using ordinal utility functions based on profiles of individual preference 
orders and resource-use capabilities, in order to come up with standards pertaining to game forms 
and social welfare as institutionalized mechanisms. Needless to say, these theories have contributed 
significantly to society and economics. This study, however, aims to determine the concrete effects 
to sustainability, fairness, disparity, etc. of explicitly incorporating cardinal norm functions in 
decision-making models, towards creating a better society, and to clarify how to foster norms in 
social systems when carrying out social practices. 
 
In this paper, in Chapter 2 we will introduce a value function that includes utility function of 
methodological individualism and norm function of social constructivism, and propose a process for 
fostering norm functions based on the establishment of social norms from the standpoint of cultural 
evolutionary and social institutional theories. In Chapter 3, we will carry out numerical simulation 
using a resource-sharing problem typical of economic activities involving the production, 
allocation, and consumption of goods and services from resources in the natural environment, and 
compare the norm functions fostered through the process proposed in Chapter 2 with a few other 
predefined norm functions, in terms of society’s total value, resource productivity, and the Gini 
coefficient. In Chapter 4, we will assess the simulation results obtained in Chapter 3 in terms of 
statistical theories on asset distribution in physical economics, and discuss the ideal state of an 
economic society needed to suppress disparity and inequality, while considering social trends and 
history of currencies and values. And, in Chapter 5, we will summarize our conclusions and discuss 
future issues and prospects in aiming for sustainability and fairness. 
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2. Decision-making model 
 
2.1 Value function 
A major decision-making theory is the rational choice theory in microeconomics. It is based on the 
principle that individuals choose the rational action that maximizes utility based on methodological 
individualism. This theory is related to Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand, one of the mainstream 
schools of thought in economics claiming that society will attain its optimum state if individuals 
pursue their self-interests. We will not discuss them all here, but this theory has been applied into 
the expected utility theory, subjective probability theory, prospect theory, and other theories 
pertaining to decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and risk, and has been widely used in 
game theory as application into sociology and political science, as well as in social choice theory, 
public choice theory, and comparative institutional analysis. 
 
In the standard rational choice model, during decision-making, the individual assigns a confidence 
level to beliefs in particular states, allocates cardinal priority criteria to desires for particular results, 
and maximizes the expected utility of the action. In the decision tree well-known for decision 
making, the individual prunes the s (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) based on beliefs, and prunes the 𝑜 (𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) based on 
desires. The individual utility function (𝑢(𝑎)) is expressed in equation (1) below, i.e., for every 
outcome (𝑜), multiply the utility of 𝑜 (𝑢(𝑜)) by the probability of 𝑜 given 𝑎 (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), (𝑝(𝑜|𝑎)), 
then add these all up (Heath 2008). The individual chooses the action (𝑎) that maximizes the utility 
function (𝑢(𝑎)). 
 
𝑢(𝑎) = ∑ 𝑝(𝑜|𝑎) 𝑢(𝑜)
𝑜
 
(1) 
 
As an argument against the rational choice theory, some authors claim that it does not take into 
consideration that the individual makes altruistic and obligatory actions against his/her self-
interests. For example, the experimental game theory pertaining to the collective action problem has 
proven that subjects exhibit cooperation and coordination at levels considerably higher than those 
predicted by the standard model. This is because humans socially learn and follow social norms, 
including language, customs, and culture, through imitative conformity (Heath, 2008). From the 
standpoint of economics, the opportunity set of the individual’s action is greater than the budget set 
of the goods, and the Invisible Hand theorem does not always lead society to its optimum state. It 
 6 
can be said, however, that society is established because social norms restrict the opportunity set of 
the individual’s actions (Basu, 2010). 
 
So far, in an attempt to incorporate social norms into rational choice models, for example, adding an 
increase in utility to the kindness of others (Rabin, 1993), or adding a reduction of utility to the 
degree of inequality between oneself and others (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) have been considered. 
However, modifications that add the benefits of interaction with others to the utility function can 
not account for a wide range of norms and anonymous cooperative behavior. Also, among the 
several versions of reciprocity altruism, direct reciprocity can not explain broad sociality without 
direct relationship. Indirect reciprocity has primary dilemma (why cooperate?) and secondary 
dilemma (why do expensive sanctions?). In order to solve these dilemmas, it is necessary to further 
assume higher order sanctions, or linking primary and secondary cooperative actions (Henrich and 
Boyd, 2001; Yamagishi and Tahakashi, 1994), but still these reasons can not be explained. Strong 
reciprocity describes the norms of cooperation by assuming the willingness to do costly altruistic 
punishment as a result of group selection (Bowles and Gintis, 2011), but can not explain other 
norms such as fairness. Empirical studies of reciprocity have shown that high-order sanctions and 
heavy punishment are not observed, and that inexpensive sanctions (e.g. break-off of relations, light 
attention, etc.) are the main (Kiyonari and Barclay, 2008; Guala, 2012). 
 
Therefore, in incorporating social norms into rational choice models, we would like to reconsider 
from two major perspectives: deontology and utilitarianism. In deontology according to Immanuel 
Kant, humans are expected to follow universal moral rules dictated by reason, and good will is an 
action only based on following one’s faith, wherein norms and ethics do not be reduced to utility. 
On the other hand, in utilitarianism, the social desirability of an action is determined by utility, and 
the goal is to maximize the summation of individual utility (“the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number”), wherein norms and ethics are embedded in utility. 
 
Although deontology is based on reason, this reason or rational thinking, from the perspective of 
social constructivism, is socially constructed along with the norms, such as language, customs, and 
culture. Norm conformity develops through imitative learning during childhood and social learning 
from the cultural environment, and cannot be isolated from the rational subject. A simple method 
for incorporating deontological constraints for actions into the rational choice model, in the same 
way as with utilities for desires, is by handling norms based on reason as instruments (Heath, 2008). 
In accordance with Savage’s trichotomy (states, actions and outcomes), the normative principle 
connected to the actions are conceived in the same way as the beliefs connected to the states and the 
 7 
outcomes connected to the desires, and normative appropriateness is assigned as weight in 
considering actions. Therefore, the individual’s value function (𝑣(𝑎)) can be expressed as the sum 
of utility (𝑢(𝑎)) and normative appropriateness (𝑛(𝑎)), as shown in equation (2). 
 
𝑣(𝑎) = 𝑢(𝑎) + 𝑛(𝑎) 
(2) 
 
From the perspective based on utilitarianism, examples of social norms are community norms that 
serve as self-enforcing solutions to the commons problem (Aoki, 2001). In this case, the emergence 
of community norms can be seen by linking the commons game and the social exchange game. The 
value function (𝑣(𝑎)) can be expressed from the utility (𝑢(𝑎)) and cooperation cost (𝐶(𝑎)) in the 
commons domain, such as in common water supplies and commonly owned forests, and the utility 
(𝑢𝑠(𝑎)) and cooperation cost (𝐶𝑠(𝑎)) in the social exchange domain, such as in mutual aid and 
cooperative, as shown in equation (3). The incentive condition for cooperation can be expressed by 
equation (4), with the current cooperation cost saving terms on the left-hand side, and the current 
value conversion (where 𝛿 is the discount factor) of the loss term arising from permanent social 
ostracization in the future on the right-hand side. When this condition holds true, the common 
expectation against social ostracization of neglects generates a cooperative community norm. 
 
𝑣(𝑎) = 𝑢(𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑎) + 𝑢𝑠(𝑎) − 𝐶𝑠(𝑎) 
(3) 
𝐶(𝑎) + 𝐶𝑠(𝑎) < 𝛿 ∙ 𝑢𝑠(𝑎) 
(4) 
 
We derived the mathematical equations (2) and (3) for a rational choice model that incorporates 
social norms from both the standpoints of deontology and utilitarianism. In deontology, norms are 
shown as intrinsic values by instrumentally treating deontic constraints due to reason. On the other 
hand, in utilitarianism, the utility of the social exchange that underlies the norm is shown as 
extrinsic value. Their mathematical expressions, although having different premises, are similar and 
can therefore be treated equally when incorporating them as information model for social practices. 
In equation (2), when the preference order for 𝑎 relative to 𝑛(𝑎) is opposite that of the preference 
order for 𝑎 relative to 𝑢(𝑎), or when 𝑢(𝑎) is expressed as an increasing function of 𝑎, and 𝑛(𝑎) is 
expressed as a decreasing function of 𝑎, then 𝑛(𝑎) becomes a cost and constraint. In equation (3), 
−𝐶(𝑎) and −𝐶𝑠(𝑎), to begin with, are costs and constraints relative to utility function 
𝑢(𝑎) + 𝑢𝑠(𝑎). Since 𝑛(𝑎) in equation (2) and −𝐶(𝑎) − 𝐶𝑠(𝑎) in equation (3) can be treated 
 8 
equally, we will use mainly equation (2) in discussions hereinafter. If the normative cost (𝑛(𝑎)) is 
redistributed as tax to society, or 𝑛(𝑎) is assumed as cooperating cost (𝐶(𝑎) + 𝐶𝑠(𝑎)) in social 
exchange, deontology can also be regarded as being reduced to social utility. 
 
2.2 Norm-fostering process 
Individuals are not born with inherent social norms but acquire them through norm conformity, 
wherein norm functions are formed separately for each person. How, then, are norm functions 
formed? The establishment of social norms can be viewed from two major standpoints; namely, the 
cultural evolutionary theory and the social institutional theory. The cultural evolutionary theory 
explains the establishment of norms as part of the dual inheritance system that arises from the 
coevolution of genetic/biological transmission and cultural/social transmission. The social 
institutional theory explains the establishment of norms as part of an institutional system arising 
from a cycling between the individual’s propensity and actions and the group’s conditions and 
symbolisms. 
 
Joseph Heath claims that humans learn norms along with language, customs, and culture through a 
genetically endowed propensity toward conformity and imitative social learning based on those 
propensities, in accordance with the gene-culture dual inheritance theory of Peter J. Richerson and 
Robert Boyd (Richerson and Boyd, 2005), and that the norms cannot be isolated from the human 
rational and intentional thinking. Moreover, Heath also argues that explicit rules are merely derived 
from norms based on regulism, which equates norms with explicit rules (e.g. signs), and that 
arbitrary boundaries can be made for actions to an unlimited extent based on regularism, which 
equates norms with regularities of actions (e.g. behavior patterns). In accordance with Robert 
Brandom’s interpretation of the origin of norms (Brandom, 1994), he claims that norms are 
enforced by the structure for mutual expectations and reciprocal sanctions based on the norm 
conformity concept forwarded by Richerson and Boyd (Heath, 2008). 
 
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath and Ivan Boldyrev revised and expanded the institutional model based on 
Masahiko Aoki’s comparative institutional analysis (Aoki, 2001) to present a recursive institutional 
system wherein: individual propensities trigger actions, the summation of the interaction of 
individual actions generates a state of equilibrium as the group’s shared expectation, a symbol 
system is brought about as the summary expression of the state of equilibrium, and the symbols 
affect the individual propensities. And, similar to Brandom’s Hegelian solution (Brandom, 2009), 
the basis for the generation of the group’s state of equilibrium from the interaction of individuals 
lies in the mutual recognition between the subject of self and of others (recognition), wherein: the 
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human mind is composed of the subject (agent) and the object (action), the subject performs actions 
as objects (performativity), and the objects influence the subjects in a manner that establishes social 
consistency (continuity) (Herrmann-Pillath and Boldyrev, 2016). 
 
Summarizing the views of Heath, Herrmann-Pillath and Ivan Boldyrev, we can say that social 
norms are fostered through the cyclic repetition of mutual expectation and recognition between the 
self and others. We therefore propose the model shown in Figure 1 as a process for fostering norm 
functions. The individual value function (𝑣(𝑎)) shown in equation (2) consists of the individual 
utility function (𝑢(𝑎)) and social norm function (𝑛(𝑎)), where the utility function (𝑢(𝑎)) is 
determined individually, whereas the norm function (𝑛(𝑎)) is influenced by the mutual expectation 
and recognition with others. In Figure 1, individual 𝑖 with the norm function 𝑛𝑖(𝑎𝑖) sends 
expectations and recognitions to individual 𝑖 − 1 with norm function 𝑛𝑖−1(𝑎𝑖−1) and individual 𝑖 +
1 with norm function 𝑛𝑖+1(𝑎𝑖+1), etc., and also likewise receives expectations and recognitions 
from individual 𝑖 − 1 and individual 𝑖 + 1, etc. In other words, individual 𝑖, individual 𝑖 − 1, 
individual 𝑖 + 1, etc., which are connected in a social relationship network, compare each other’s 
norm functions. And, through a cyclic repetition of mutual expectation and recognition, as shown in 
equation (5), the norm function 𝑛𝑖(𝑎)[𝑡] is gradually updated into norm function 𝑛𝑖(𝑎)[𝑡 + 1] at a 
certain point for each individual or after 𝑡 number of repetitions, progressively converging into 
𝑛𝑖(𝑎)[∞], wherein norms are fostered as the group’s shared expectation, eventually generating the 
group’s state of equilibrium. As such, it will be possible to perform numerical simulation for 
cardinal and concrete problems based on the norm-fostering process shown in Figure 1. 
 
𝑛𝑖(𝑎)[𝑡]   →   𝑛𝑖(𝑎)[𝑡 + 1]   →   𝑛𝑖(𝑎)[∞] 
(5) 
 
 
Figure 1 Norm-fostering process based on mutual expectation and recognition. 
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3. Resource-sharing problem 
 
3.1 Problem setting 
Broadly speaking, economic activities pertain to the acquisition of resources from the natural 
environment, and production, allocation, and consumption of goods and services. To determine the 
effects of social norms on sustainability, fairness, disparity, etc., we looked at the resource-sharing 
problem as a typical example of economic activities. The resource-sharing problem is a typical 
example pertaining to the competition for shared resources related to disparity and inequality in 
production activities, allocation of resources and energy, traffic congestion, and the supply chain. It 
is also a problem that encompasses the tragedy of commons, which deals with the competition 
problem between producers for shared resources; the public goods game, which deals with the 
contribution problem for cooperation cost for public benefits; and the community norm problem 
based on the linking game for public goods and social exchange (Aoki, 2001); and can therefore be 
considered as a mathematical model for the cardinal computation of these problems. 
 
The resource-sharing problem deals with the problem of the use of shared resources by each 
individual to gain profits. Since the resource unit price increases when the total amount of used 
resources increases, a state of equilibrium in the group arises between the maximization of self-
value through the use of more resources by each individual and the increase in the resource unit 
price of the entire group. The state of equilibrium arises when each individual tries to maximize 
self-value. The resource-sharing problem can be expressed as a distributed constraint optimization 
problem as shown in equation (6), where 𝑁 is total number of persons in the group, 𝑥𝑖 is the 
resource used by individual 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁), 𝑓𝑖 (𝑥𝑖) is the value function, and 𝑔 is the total cost 
function determined by the total used resources (e.g. Boyd et al., 2011). 
 
arg max
{𝑥𝑖}
 ∑ 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
− 𝑔 (∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
) 
(6) 
 
For setting a concrete problem, 𝑥𝑖 is expressed as the resource used by individual and 𝑍 as the total 
resources used by the group (equation (7)), and unit price for resource is expressed as 𝑝 (equation 
(8)). The resource unit price 𝑝 is the result of adding the constant 𝑐 to the product of the coefficient 
𝑏 and total resource 𝑍 raised to the power of 𝑟. Exponent 𝑟 is 𝑟 > 1, and expresses the effect of 
increasing costs. As shown in equation (9), the profit, i.e., the utility function (𝑢𝑖), of individual 𝑖 is 
the result of subtracting the product of used resources (𝑥𝑖) and resource unit price (𝑝) from the 
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product of resource (𝑥𝑖) raised to the power of 𝑠 and action (𝑎𝑖) of individual 𝑖. Action (𝑎𝑖) of 
individual 𝑖 can be interpreted as the production capacity relative to the resources, as the potential 
for handling the resources, or as the effort needed to obtain profit from the resources. Exponent 𝑠 is 
𝑠 < 1, and expresses the effect of diminishing returns. As shown in equation (10), the combination 
of equations (7) to (9) corresponds to equation (6), which represents the original distributed 
optimization problem. 
 
𝑧 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(7) 
𝑝 = 𝑏 ∙ 𝑧𝑟 + 𝑐 
(8) 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 
(9) 
arg max
{𝑥𝑖}
∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= arg max
{𝑥𝑖}
∑ 𝑎𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑠
𝑁
𝑖=1
− ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ∙ {𝑏 ∙ (∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
𝑟
+ 𝑐}
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(10) 
 
Thus far, we have shown equations using only utility function (𝑢𝑖). To incorporate social norms, we 
will replace the utility function (𝑢𝑖) shown in equation (9) with the value function incorporating 
norm function shown in equation (2). To compare the effect of norm, we set three value functions 
(𝑣1𝑖 , 𝑣2𝑖 , 𝑣3𝑖) as shown in equations (11) to (13). For the value function 𝑣1𝑖 in equation (11), we set 
the norm function multiplied with the norm coefficient 𝑛1𝑖, which differs for each individual (𝑖) 
relative to used resource (𝑥𝑖). This norm coefficient (𝑛1𝑖) is fostered through mutual expectation 
and recognition with others, as shown in Figure 1 and equation (5). Here, using criteria based on the 
equity theory (Adams, 1963) as the criteria for mutual comparison, as show in equation (14), 
through the norm-fostering process, the value/action ratio (𝑣1𝑖[𝑡] 𝑎𝑖⁄ ) for individual (𝑖) is mutually 
compared with 𝑚 number of other persons connected in a social relationship network (shown in 
Figure 3 below), and the norm (𝑛1𝑖[𝑡]) is gradually updated into (𝑛1𝑖[𝑡 + 1]) in ∆ steps. As will be 
demonstrated in the results of simulation in Section 3.2, the last term of equation (11) can be 
considered as a progressive tax-like cost (however, it should be noted that the result is a progressive 
tax-like, not an ex-post cost redistribution by tax collection, but an ongoing cost distribution by 
interaction between individuals). For 𝑣2𝑖 in equation (12), we set the norm function multiplied with 
the norm coefficient 𝑛2, which is a constant ratio relative to used resources (𝑥𝑖). The last term of 
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equation (12) is a proportional tax-like (consumption tax) cost. For 𝑣3𝑖  in equation (13), we set the 
norm coefficient 𝑛3, which is a fixed value regardless of used resources (𝑥𝑖). The last term of 
equation (13) is a fixed tax-like cost. The sum of the normative cost for the group (the so-called 
total tax revenue) is expressed in equations (15) to (17) respectively for value functions 
𝑣1𝑖 , 𝑣2𝑖, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣3𝑖 of equations (11) to (13). 
 
𝑣1𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑛1𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑛1𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 
(11) 
𝑣2𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑛2 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑛2 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 
(12) 
𝑣3𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑛3 = 𝑎𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑛3 
(13) 
𝑣1𝑖[𝑡]
𝑎𝑖
 ⋛  
1
𝑚
∙ ∑
𝑣1𝑗 [𝑡]
𝑎𝑗
𝑚
𝑗≠𝑖
   ⇒    𝑛1𝑖[𝑡 + 1] = 𝑛1𝑖[𝑡] ± ∆ 
(14) 
𝑤1 = ∑ 𝑛1𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(15) 
𝑤2 = ∑ 𝑛2 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(16) 
𝑤3 = 𝑛3 ∙ 𝑁 
(17) 
 
Although the resource-sharing problem is a distributed optimization problem for the group, it is a 
rational choice problem for maximizing value functions (𝑣1𝑖, 𝑣2𝑖 , 𝑣3𝑖) for each individual (𝑖), and a 
problem for finding the optimum value for used resources (𝑥𝑖) relative to the individual (𝑖) action 
(𝑎𝑖) and resource unit price (𝑝). Optimum values for used resources (𝑥𝑖) for each of the value 
functions (𝑣1𝑖 , 𝑣2𝑖 , 𝑣3𝑖) in equations (11) to (13) are shown in equations (18) to (20), respectively. 
However, since resource unit price (𝑝) changes depending on the resources used by others, there is 
a need to gradually update the optimum values until the group reaches a state of equilibrium. As 
shown in Figure 2, in the computational flow for value function 𝑣1𝑖 of equation (11), first, the total 
resource (𝑧[𝑡 + 1]) is computed from used resource (𝑥𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁)) for a certain point of time 
or for 𝑡 number of repetitions, then, the resource unit price (𝑝[𝑡 + 1]) is computed from 𝑧[𝑡] and 
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𝑧[𝑡 + 1], the norm (𝑛1𝑖[𝑡]) is updated to (𝑛1𝑖[𝑡 + 1]) in ∆ steps based on individual (𝑖) value/action 
ratio (𝑣1𝑖[𝑡] 𝑎𝑖⁄ ) and on mutual comparison with others following equation (14), and the optimum 
value of used resource (𝑥𝑖) is computed for point 𝑡 + 1 is computed following equation (18), 
recursively repeating the entire process until the optimum value converges. Here, finding resource 
unit price (𝑝) from not only 𝑧[𝑡 + 1], but the sum of 𝑧[𝑡] and 𝑧[𝑡 + 1], is done for computational 
reasons; namely, to prevent sudden fluctuations in resource unit price and hasten the convergence. 
Moreover, the computational flows for value functions 𝑣2𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣3𝑖 of equations (12) and (13) are 
similar to the computational flow shown in Figure 2, except for the absence of update of norm 
coefficients and the computation of optimum value following equations (19) and (20), respectively. 
 
𝑥𝑖 = (
𝑠 ∙ 𝑎𝑖
𝑝 + 𝑛1𝑖
)
1
1−𝑠
 
(18) 
𝑥𝑖 = (
𝑠 ∙ 𝑎𝑖
𝑝 + 𝑛2
)
1
1−𝑠
 
(19) 
𝑥𝑖 = (
𝑠 ∙ 𝑎𝑖
𝑝
)
1
1−𝑠
 
(20) 
 
 
Figure 2 Computational flow of norm-fostering process for resource-sharing problem. 
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3.2 Numerical simulation 
We conducted actual numerical simulation by setting the total number of persons in the group to 
100 (𝑁 = 100), and set the social relationship network for individual (𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁)) assuming 
a scale-free network topology, as shown in Figure 3. A scale-free network is a network topology 
that is commonly seen in Internet and literature citation relationships, as well as in social 
relationships. Figure 3 is an example of a scale-free network with 100 nodes and 2 degrees 
generated using the famous Barabási-Albert model. 
 
The distribution of actions (𝑎𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁)) of individual (𝑖) is set as two types of distribution, 
namely, the normal distribution and power-law distribution, as shown in Figure 4. For the normal 
distribution, which is widely observed for academic grades, body height, and production capability, 
in Figure 4, the average value for action (𝑎𝑖) is set to ?̅? = 𝜇 = 0.5, standard deviation to 𝜎 = 0.1, 
and histogram bin to ⊿𝑎 = 0.025. The power-law distribution is a long-tail distribution widely 
observed for populations, incomes, and assets. In Figure 4, the probability density function for 
power-law distribution is set to 1 4⁄ ∙ 𝑎−𝑘 , and 𝑘 = 2, since the scaling exponent for income or 
asset distribution is empirically usually 2. Also, since the average value has no meaning in the 
power-law distribution, the median value is set to ?̃? = 0.5 in accordance with the average value (?̅?) 
in the normal distribution, and the histogram bin to ⊿𝑎 = 0.025 as with the normal distribution. 
 
The calculation parameter set points are set to: equation (8) coefficient 𝑏 = 0.001, constant term 
𝑐 = 1.0, exponent 𝑟 = 2.0, equation (11) to (13) exponent 𝑠 = 0.5, and equation (14) step ∆= 0.05. 
And, all computational conditions are prepared by setting the initial value to 𝑧[0] = 1.0 for 𝑡 = 0 of 
total resource 𝑍, enabling simulation following the computational flow in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 3 Social relations network (Barabási-Albert model, 100 nodes, 2 degrees). 
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Figure 4 Histograms of normal distribution and power-law distribution of actions. 
 
Figure 5 shows the results of simulation using value function 𝑣1𝑖 (progressive tax-like, value/action 
ratio) of equation (11), 𝑣2𝑖 (proportional tax-like) of equation (12), and 𝑣3𝑖 (fixed tax-like) of 
equation (13), for the normal distribution and power-law distribution of individual (𝑖) action (𝑎𝑖). 
The three graphs on the left side of Figure 5 follow a normal distribution, while the three graphs on 
the right side follow a power-law distribution, with the upper two graphs corresponding to value 
function 𝑣1𝑖, the middle two graphs to 𝑣2𝑖, and the lower two graphs to 𝑣3𝑖. The vertical axis of 
each graph indicates value function (𝑣1𝑖 , 𝑣2𝑖 , 𝑣3𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁)), and the horizontal axis indicates 
repetition number (𝑡). Here, to compare between the same type of distribution, for the normal 
distribution, we adjusted the values of 𝑛2 and 𝑛3 in accordance with the computation results for 𝑤1 
so that the sum of normative cost (total tax revenue) shown in equations (15) to (17) will be equal, 
i.e., 𝑤1 = 𝑤2 = 𝑤3 ≃ 1.85. Likewise, for the power-law distribution, we adjusted the values so that 
𝑤1 = 𝑤2 = 𝑤3 ≃ 1.62. All the graphs show that the value for value functions (𝑣1𝑖, 𝑣2𝑖 , 𝑣3𝑖) 
converge as the number of repetitions (𝑡) for recursive computation increase. 
 
Figure 6 shows histograms for distribution of values for value functions (𝑣1𝑖 , 𝑣2𝑖, 𝑣3𝑖) for 𝑡 = 100 
repetitions, where recursive computations have fully converged. The four graphs on the left side of 
Figure 6 follow a normal distribution, while the four graphs on the right side follow a power-law 
distribution, with the first (uppermost) two graphs showing the original distribution of action (𝑎𝑖), 
the second two graphs show the distribution for value function 𝑣1𝑖 (progressive tax-like), the third 
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two graphs for 𝑣2𝑖 (proportional tax-like), and the fourth (lowermost) two graphs for 𝑣3𝑖 (fixed tax-
like). 
 
 
Figure 5 Simulation results of value functions based on recursive computational flow. 
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Figure 6 Histograms of individual action distributions and value function distributions. 
 
From Figures 5 and 6, we can see that for both normal and power-law distributions, in contrast to 
the distribution of individual (𝑖) action (𝑎𝑖), the distribution of value (𝑣) widens as norms shift from 
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progressive tax-like norm (𝑛1𝑖), to proportional tax-like norm (𝑛2), and to fixed tax-like norm (𝑛3), 
i.e., the disparity among individuals widens. Comparing normal distribution and power-law 
distribution shows that the power-law distribution has a wider spread compared to the normal 
distribution. As shown in Figure 7, plotting the value (𝑣1𝑖 , 𝑣2𝑖 , 𝑣3𝑖) against action (𝑎𝑖) shows that 
value 𝑣1𝑖 is proportional to action (𝑎𝑖) for the progressive tax-like norm (𝑛1𝑖), whereas values 
𝑣2𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣3𝑖 exhibit the square function of action (𝑎𝑖) for the proportional tax-like norm (𝑛2) and 
fixed tax-like norm (𝑛3), indicating an expanding disparity for these two norms. 
 
Values (𝑣2𝑖 , 𝑣3𝑖) exhibit square functions for norm 𝑛2 and norm 𝑛3 because the exponent 
(1 (1 − 𝑠⁄ ) (s = 0.5) in equations (19) and (20) is a square. This means that when the utility 
function diminishes, the disparity tends to widen. As shown in Figure 8, values 𝑣1𝑖  for norm 𝑛1𝑖 do 
not exhibit a square function but a linear function because the normative cost based on the fairness 
criteria increases proportionally relative to the action (𝑎𝑖), which in turn suppresses disparity. 
However, looking at Figure 8, we can see that the normative costs for norm 𝑛1𝑖 and norm 𝑛2 are 
almost equal; indicating that disparity might also be suppressed in norm 𝑛2. Figure 9 clearly shows, 
however, that in the upper end of the distribution of action (𝑎𝑖), norm 𝑛2 has significantly smaller 
norm coefficient than norm 𝑛1𝑖, which is the opposite for the lower end. Because of this, as is 
evident in equations (11) and (12) and equations (18) and (19), values 𝑣2𝑖 for norm 𝑛2 enlarge to 
almost the square of action (𝑎𝑖) in the upper end of the distribution of action (𝑎𝑖) compared to norm 
𝑛1𝑖, while, conversely, normative cost enlarges to almost the square of action (𝑎𝑖) in the lower end. 
Disparity, therefore, is wider for the proportional tax-like norm (𝑛2). 
 
 
Figure 7 Comparison of dependence of value functions on actions of individuals. 
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Figure 8 Comparison of dependence of normative costs on actions of individuals. 
 
 
Figure 9 Comparison of dependence of norm coefficients on actions of individuals. 
 
Figure 10 shows results of computation of total value (sum of value functions 𝑣1𝑖 , 𝑣2𝑖, 𝑣3𝑖) and total 
resources (𝑧[100]) for 𝑡 = 100 repetitions for a population of 100 persons. Both the total value and 
total resources become larger as norms shift from progressive tax-like norm (𝑛1𝑖), to proportional 
tax-like norm (𝑛2), and to fixed tax-like norm (𝑛3), and the power-law distribution is larger than the 
normal distribution. These tendencies can be attributed to having individuals in the upper end of the 
distribution of action (𝑎𝑖) use more resources and gain more value, for the fixed tax-like norm 𝑛3 
and proportional tax-like norm 𝑛2 compared to the progressive tax-like norm 𝑛1𝑖, as well for the 
power-law distribution compared to the normal distribution. In other words, the fixed tax-like norm 
𝑛3 and proportional tax-like norm 𝑛2 tend to expand disparity, particularly in a power-law 
distribution. 
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Figure 11 shows the resource productivity (total value/total resource ratio) computed from the total 
value and total resources shown in Figure 10 and the Gini coefficients computed from distribution 
of value (𝑣). Progressive tax-like norm (𝑛1𝑖) has the highest resource productivity compared to 
fixed tax-line norm (𝑛3) and proportional tax-like norm (𝑛2). In terms of the Gini coefficients, 
compared to the other two norms, progressive tax-like norm (𝑛1𝑖) has the lowest coefficient, which 
is the same as the Gini coefficient of the original distribution of action (𝑎𝑖) (dotted line in the 
figure). This means that progressive tax-like norm (𝑛1𝑖) has the highest sustainability in terms of the 
efficient use of resources, and has the highest fairness and suppression of disparity in terms of 
maintaining and preventing the increase of the Gini coefficient. Moreover, although this section 
only presents results of simulation for a single set of conditions for social relationship network, 
individual action distribution, and calculation parameters, it should be noted that the tendencies for 
the results given in this section would remain the same even if the conditions are changed. 
 
 
Figure 10 Comparison of total values and total resources for action distributions and norms. 
 
 
Figure 11 Comparison of resource productivities and Gini coefficients. 
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4. Discussions 
 
4.1 Review of Results 
Results of numerical simulation using the resource-sharing problem as a typical example of 
economic activities have shown that the progressive tax-like norm function fostered through the 
mutual comparison of value/action ration based on the equity theory has higher resource 
productivity and lower Gini coefficient than proportional tax-like or fixed tax-like norm functions. 
In other words, it is the most preferable norm function in terms of sustainability and fairness. Also, 
considering the negative correlation between the Gini coefficient and the human development index 
developed by Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq (Holden et al., 2014), the progressive tax-like norm 
function is also preferable in terms of the individual’s capabilities. In the proportional tax-like and 
fixed tax-like norm functions, the distribution of value widens to a square of the distribution of 
individual actions, pointing to a tendency for widening of disparity among individuals. Since 
individuals in the upper end of the distribution of actions use more resources and gain more value 
than those in the lower end, the consumption of total resources would also increase along with the 
increase in the total value of the group. Realizing sustainable, fair, and inclusive societies, such as 
by reducing income disparity and inequalities, ensuring access to energy, protection of the 
environment, and other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations 
(United Nations, 2018), entail not only considering utility in terms of value in society, but also 
require fostering progressive tax-like norms that are excellent in sustainability and fairness. The 
progressive tax-like norms here is based on individual values, not ex-post social security, but 
fostered in the ongoing interaction between individuals, and that eventually bring a progressive tax 
result at a group’s state of equilibrium. 
 
In regard to the effect of the distribution of actions, results of simulation showed that the normal 
distribution has higher resource productivity, albeit only slightly, than power-law distribution, but 
significantly lower Gini coefficient. Since the power-law distribution has wider spread than the 
normal distribution, there is a tendency for those in the upper end of the distribution of actions to be 
also in the upper end of the distribution of values. Since the disparity in the distribution of values is 
wider for proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms, even for the normal distribution, in cases 
when the value obtained in the current period becomes an asset and affects the action in the next 
period, it can be easily inferred that the normal distribution will also eventually approach a widely 
spread distribution similar to the power-law distribution. In regard to how the distribution of assets 
arise in the first place, it is known that the random-sharing model, where assets are randomly shared 
between two parties, exhibits an exponential distribution (Chakraborti and Chakrabarti, 2010), 
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while the model for performing exchange and saving of assets exhibits a shift from a distribution 
similar to a normal distribution to that similar to a power-law distribution as the ratio of the savings 
against assets decreases (change in gamma distribution parameter) (Angle, 2006). Consequently, as 
long as assets are exchanged, the distribution of actions in the initial period of the resource-sharing 
problem approaches the power-law distribution, and if the value obtained in the current period 
becomes an asset, the disparity in value and assets in the next periods will recursively expand for 
proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms. These relationships are similar to the r>g (return on 
capital > economic growth) configuration shown by Thomas Piketty in regard to capitalization rate 
and economic growth rate (Piketty, 2014). 
 
In the progressive tax-like norm based on the fairness criteria (value/action ratio), although it is 
possible to maintain and prevent the increase of disparity of the original action distribution, it is not 
possible to modify the original action distribution itself. If the original distribution would be 
modified despite having an exchange of assets, a norm more rigid than the progressive tax-like 
norm would be necessary. Would it be possible, however, to foster such a norm? In developmental 
psychology, humans are said to possess moral norms pertaining to fairness and what’s right and 
wrong from infancy (Surian et al., 2018). These are norms, however, that arise for survival, such as 
physical safety and health instincts, wherein it is unlikely for humans to have instinctive norms 
more rigid than fairness. In cultural psychology, humans are said to acquire a value system through 
their families or schools at an early age, by the time they reach around 10 to 12 years old, wherein it 
is fairly difficult to change the mental program acquired at this stage (Hofstede et al., 2013). 
Therefore, humans are not expected to develop norms more rigid than fairness at home or in 
schools. 
 
From the perspective of human history, the agricultural society began after the neolithic age around 
8500 years BC, after evolving through the hunting-gathering society that came about after the birth 
of Homo sapiens around 200,000 years ago. The exchange of goods was a main practice, and norms 
on fairness must have already developed sufficiently in the beginning of the agricultural society. 
The history of money began as a replacement to bartering; namely, the weighing currency came 
about as a measure of value around 3300 BC, and the precious metal currency came about as a 
means to save value around the 5th century BC. Capitalization began around the end of the 16th 
century, and asset management began around the beginning of the 18th century. Therefore, only a 
mere 0.2% of human history has passed since capitalization and asset management started. Norms 
more rigid than fairness were not recorded even during the axial age from around 800 BC to 200 
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BC, a period that produced many philosophers and thinkers. Humans, therefore, still do not possess 
the norms needed for properly adapting to capitalization and asset management. 
 
Therefore, we believe that it is imperative to prevent deviations from occurring in the original 
distribution of actions, to generate value through norms based on fairness, to increase sustainability, 
and to suppress disparity. In other words, there is a need to eliminate the conversion of generated 
values into assets and the exchange of assets, and to aim for a society where economic activities are 
carried out based on progressive tax-like norms. A globalized economic society, however, may not 
be receptive to adapting progressive tax-like norms. Kaushik Basu explained the importance of 
international policy coordination aimed at anti-poverty and inequality mitigation, while also talking 
about the difficulty and the hope of achieving them (Basu, 2010). In our present world, there are tax 
havens that allow rich people to avoid taxes, some countries grant tax relief to attract and nurture 
companies, and taxation measures centered on consumption tax (proportional tax) are being 
implemented, showing that international coordination on tax policies is still something far in the 
future. 
 
What should we do, therefore? One hope that we have is in the transformation from global to local 
and into a regional and community economy (Hiroi, 2009). This is related to patronizing regional 
cuisine, promoting local production for local consumption, use of renewable energy, focus on local 
ties and culture, and other advocacies forwarded by Helena Norberg-Hodge, Junko Edahiro, and 
others (Norberg-Hodge, 2016; Edahiro, 2018). We would like to rethink the three patterns 
(reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange) in economic society forwarded by Karl Polanyi (Polanyi, 
1977) as reciprocal coordination and sharing through mutual expectation and recognition, 
redistribution and resetting of assets through progressive tax-like norms, and equal exchange and 
stockless economic cycling, with a focus on the region and community as the target for social 
practice, towards the establishment of an ideal, self-reliant local society. In addition, by 
incorporating progressive tax-like norms into the design of regional currency, including the 
depreciation of money put forward by Silvio Gessell, we believe that we will be able to guarantee 
sustainability and fairness at least within the region or community. 
 
4.2 Effects 
Conventionally, decision-making theories have focused only on utility functions, e.g. the game 
theory measures utility based on the payoff matrix or the logic tree, while welfare economics has 
made logical definitions of institutionalized mechanisms based on axiomatic approaches. In this 
paper, we introduced a value function that adds norm function in addition to utility function, and 
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conducted a numerical simulation of a mathematically modeled resource-sharing problem to 
compute resource productivity and Gini coefficients while comparing concrete modalities for social 
norms, enabling us to arrive at suggestions regarding sustainability and fairness. The approach 
presented in this paper has the potential to contribute in social practices aimed at realizing a society 
based on social norms, through mutual complementation with decision-making theories, 
experimental economic theories, welfare economic theories, and other theories. 
 
Our approach, which incorporates both aspects of utility and norm, to the resource-sharing problem 
can also be applied to problems in the real world where there is competition for resources, such as 
in energy demand and supply, traffic congestion, and the supply chain. A similar approach can also 
be applied to problems other than the resource-sharing problem and other distributed optimization 
problems, such as to the knapsack problem for selecting a variety of commodities, the multi-
objective optimization problem for operating passenger buses, and the travelling salesman problem 
for delivering local services, and may be useful in discussing sustainability, fairness, disparity, and 
other issues. 
 
As the future society that Japan should aspire to realize, the Japanese government has proposed the 
vision for Society 5.0. Society 5.0 is defined as a “human-centered society that balances economic 
advancement with the resolution of social problems by a system that highly integrates cyberspace 
and physical space” (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2014) and succeeds the hunting society 
(Society 1.0), agricultural society (Society 3.0), industrial society (Society 3.0), and information 
society (Society 4.0). Until the information society, data analysis, explanation, and prediction of 
phenomena were performed according to physical paradigms. To contribute to the realization of 
Society 5.0, a new paradigm is proposed that consists of the diagnosis and prognosis of social 
phenomena in real time according to clinical medical models and the clinical intervention of social 
systems by IT systems (Deguchi et al., 2018a). 
 
Society 5.0 aims to solve social problems such as the redistribution of wealth and the remediation of 
regional disparities, as well as enable an active and enjoyable life for everyone. Similarly, the SDGs 
adopted by the United Nations are aimed at eradication of poverty and hunger, reduction of income 
disparity and inequality, affordable energy and environmental preservation, inclusive employment 
and institutions, etc. to realize a sustainable, diverse, and inclusive society for all (United Nations, 
2018). Achieving these goals requires a consideration of social norms, morals, and ethics, such as 
impartiality, fairness, virtue, and justice, as well as the implementation of normativity and ethics, 
other than utility in terms of convenience and efficiency of products and services, into IT systems. 
 25 
 
Therefore a system is proposed that fuses social systems and IT systems, and in which IT systems 
perform diagnosis and prognosis of social systems and carry out real-time normative and ethical 
interventions to social systems based on the diagnosis and prognosis, as shown in Figure 12  
(Deguchi et al., 2018a, b; Karasawa et al., 2018). In this fused system, IT systems carry out 
normative intervention in the different layers; namely, in the micro-level individual decision-
making and actions, the macro-level interactions between individuals, and the meta-level social 
institutions. Although the norm-fostering process based on mutual expectation and recognition 
proposed in this paper mainly relate to the inter-individual interaction layer, since individuals are 
made up of the subject, object (action), and a mutual recognition with others, and institutions are 
created from recursive cycles of individual actions and group states of equilibrium, the norm-
fostering process therefore also in fact relates to the individual and institutional layers. 
 
Implementing the norm-fostering process proposed in this paper to IT systems, for example, in the 
inter-individual interaction layer, will entail the mutual exchange of information on value/action 
ratios and the mutual transmission of votes and appraisals through IT interfaces. For the individual 
layer, it will involve nudging and persuasion using behavioral science to promote normative 
actions. And for the institutional layer, it will involve the provision of information pertaining to 
predicted equilibrium states and scenarios to facilitate the generation of shared expectations. We 
plan to carry out concrete trials regarding the implementation of IT systems and the modalities of 
the norms explained in this paper through social verification experiments on self-sufficiency of 
renewable energy and supply chains for local production for local consumption, towards the 
establishment of self-reliant regional societies that are sustainable, fair, and inclusive. 
 
 
Figure 12 Normative intervention of social systems by IT systems in Society 5.0. 
 26 
5. Summary 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
Towards the realization of a sustainable and fair society, we introduced a decision-making model 
based on value functions that include utility function and norm function, and proposed a norm-
fostering process that recursively updates norm function through mutual expectation and 
recognition between the self and others. Moreover, we conducted numerical simulation using the 
resource-sharing problem, and showed that the progressive tax-like norm, which is based on the 
value/action ratio, is preferable over proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms in terms of 
resource productivity (sustainability) and Gini coefficient (fairness). 
 
(1) We incorporated the social norm function in addition to the individual utility function into the 
decision-making model in terms of normative appropriateness and moral cost from the 
standpoint of deontology, and in terms of social exchange cost and social preferences from 
the standpoint of utilitarianism. Further, we proposed a norm-fostering process that 
recursively and gradually updates norm functions while repeating cycles of mutual 
expectation and recognition, in terms social learning and mutual expectation based on 
conformity from the standpoint of the cultural evolutionary theory, and in terms of mutual 
recognition that serves as basis for the group’s shared expectation from the standpoint of 
social institutional theory. 
 
(2) We looked at the resource-sharing problem as a typical example pertaining to the competition 
for shared resources related to production activities, allocation of resources and energy, traffic 
congestion, and the supply chain. After estimating the increasing cost function for resource 
unit price and the diminishing return function for utility, we defined three norm functions 
(progressive tax-like, proportional tax-like, and fixed tax-like) for comparison. In the 
computational flow for progressive tax-like norm function, the norm function was recursively 
updated through mutual comparison with others using value/action ratio based on the equity 
theory as criteria.  
 
(3) Results of numerical simulation of the normal distribution and power-law distribution of 
actions assuming a scale-free network for a group of 100 persons showed that, for both types 
of distribution of actions, value is proportional to action in the progressive tax-like norm, 
while values exhibit the square function of actions for the proportional tax-like and fixed tax-
like norms, leading to increase in disparity. In regard to the group’s total value and total 
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resources, it was found that they were larger in the power-law distribution than in the normal 
distribution, that they were also larger in the proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms 
than in the progressive tax-like norm, and that individuals in the upper end of the distribution 
of actions use more resources and gain more value than those in the lower end of the 
distribution for the proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms. Looking at these results 
from another perspective, we could say that the progressive tax-like norm results in the 
highest resource productivity and the lowest Gini coefficient, meaning that it exhibits the 
highest sustainability and fairness compared to the other norms. 
 
5.2 Future prospects 
We will continue to hope for a global coordination in international policies, as we move ahead in 
conducting trials for social practices in local regions and communities, in order to foster a norm that 
not only seeks utility in terms of profits or benefits as a social value but also has excellent 
sustainability and fairness. Going forward, we would like to take the first step towards achieving 
sustainability and fairness in the region and community, more than as a nation or internationally, by 
aiming for coordination and sharing based on reciprocal and mutual expectation and recognition, 
redistribution and resetting of assets through norms, and equal exchange and stockless economic 
cycling, as well as by considering the design of institutions and regional currency. 
 
The design and fostering process for norm functions reported in this paper point to, so to speak, a 
clinical medical prescription and a practical method for intervention of social systems. One of the 
next issues that need to be addressed is to diagnose separately utility functions and normative 
functions from behavioral data of individuals and groups in the real world, and to apply the 
diagnosis to prescriptions. In addition, it is to determine the effect free-riders and offenders have on 
sustainability and fairness, in other words when the intervention based on the prescription is not 
effective, and investigate the homeostasis in the cycling and maintenance of social groups. Another 
issue is to determine the effects of regional and community culture and reevaluate the design of 
norms and methods of intervention that are suitable to value systems and customs. We will 
endeavor to contribute to the realization of a better society through these activities. 
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